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Abstract 
With the help of two examples, we illustrate the usefulness of agent-based models as a tool 
for economic policy design. In our first example, we apply a financial market model in which 
the order flow of speculators, relying on technical and fundamental analysis, generates 
intricate price dynamics. In our second example, we apply a Keynesian-type goods market 
model in which the investment behavior of firms, relying on extrapolative and regressive 
predictors, generates complex business cycles. We add a central authority to these two setups 
and explore the impact of simple intervention strategies on the model dynamics. Based on 
these experiments, we conclude that agent-based models may help us to understand how 
markets function and to evaluate the effectiveness of various stabilization policies. 
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1 Introduction 
Agent-based models have made substantial progress in various areas of economic research in 
recent years (for surveys see Tesfatsion and Judd 2006, Hens and Schenk-Hoppé 2009, Rosser 
2009). In this contribution, we discuss the usefulness of these models for economic policy 
design by means of two examples. Our first example is concerned with financial markets. 
Here we present an agent-based financial market model in which a central authority, say a 
central bank, applies simple intervention rules to stabilize the evolution of prices. In our 
second example, we develop an agent-based goods market model to study how a central 
authority, say a government, may stabilize national income by adjusting its expenditure. 
Overall, we conclude that agent-based models may serve as artificial laboratories to study 
how markets function and the effects of various stabilization policies. Moreover, we also 
provide advice on how to design and implement such policy experiments and point out their 
shortcomings, drawbacks and limitations. To be able to pin down the effects of regularity 
policies, our survey focuses primarily on small-scale agent-based models.  
Let us turn to our first example. From an economic point of view, financial markets 
are quite volatile and frequently display severe bubbles and crashes. Since the dynamics of 
financial markets may be harmful to the real economy, policy makers regularly debate about 
the stronger regulation of financial markets. However, it is often unclear how the 
implementation of policy measures such as transaction taxes, trading halts or short-selling 
constraints will affect the markets, especially if they have never been applied before. 
Fortunately, a number of agent-based financial market models (e.g. Day and Huang 1990, 
Kirman 1991, Chiarella 1992, de Grauwe et al. 1993, Lux 1995, Brock and Hommes 1998, 
LeBaron et al. 1999, Farmer and Joshi 2002, Westerhoff and Dieci 2006, He and Li 2007) 
exist which have improved our understanding of financial markets and which may be used to 
address these questions.  
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The dynamics of agent-based financial market models is driven by the trading 
behavior of heterogeneous speculators who follow simple trading strategies. As we know 
from many empirical studies, as summarized by Menkhoff and Taylor (2007), financial 
market participants rely on technical and fundamental analysis to predict the future direction 
of the market. Whilst technical analysis (Murphy 1999) derives trading signals from past price 
movements, fundamental analysis (Graham and Dodd 1951) presumes that prices will return 
towards their fundamental values. Note that trend-extrapolating behavior and mean-reversion 
behavior have also been observed in laboratory experiments, as summarized by Hommes 
(2011), so there is widespread empirical evidence to back the main cornerstones of these 
models.  
Overall, technical analysis destabilizes financial markets. In periods where many 
speculators opt for technical analysis, strong price fluctuations and significant bubbles may be 
observed. In contrast, fundamental analysis lends stability to financial markets. In a market in 
which a sufficiently large number of speculators follow fundamental analysis, prices are 
relatively stable and tend to move towards fundamental values. Of course, alternating periods 
of turbulent and calm market dynamics may emerge if both forces act together. Since agent-
based financial market models are quite powerful, they have already been used in the past as 
artificial laboratories to scrutinize the effects of various policy measures (see Westerhoff 2008 
for an early survey).  
In the current study, we use an agent-based financial market model by Franke and 
Westerhoff (2012). In their model, a market maker adjusts prices with respect to excess 
demand and speculators select between technical and fundamental trading rules to determine 
their orders. The speculators’ choice of trading rules is endogenous and depends on 
predisposition effects, herding behavior and market circumstances. As it turns out, this model 
is quite successful at mimicking the dynamics of financial markets. Since prices adjust in this 
model with respect to excess demand, it is easy to add a central authority that also participates 
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in the trading process and, by manipulating excess demand, seeks to direct the development of 
prices. In particular, we explore two strategies. According to the first strategy, the central 
authority buys in undervalued markets and sells in overvalued markets, thus trading in the 
same direction in which fundamental traders usually trade. According to the second strategy, 
the central authority trades against past price trends and thus counters the orders of chartists. 
As we will see, agent-based models may help us to understand how such interventions may 
influence the market dynamics. 
Small-scale agent-based business cycle models have also been proposed in recent 
years, such as those by Westerhoff (2006a), Tuinstra and Wagener (2007), Franke (2008), 
Branch and McGough (2009), Lines and Westerhoff (2010), de Grauwe (2010), Anufriev et 
al. (2012) and Franke (2012). Although these models are not yet as well developed as their 
financial market counterparts, they are already able to explain business cycle dynamics, at 
least to some degree. In most of these models, market participants have to form expectations, 
say inflation expectations or output expectations. For this task, they endogenously select 
between different forecasting rules (the analogy between agent-based financial market models 
and agent-based business cycle models will be clarified below) and it is this switching 
behavior that creates endogenous dynamics in these models. The use of extrapolative 
expectations tends to amplify business cycle fluctuations whilst the use of regressive 
expectations exerts a dampening effect on the dynamics. If both forces gain and lose 
popularity over time, intricate business cycles may emerge. We are currently observing 
several new exciting results with respect to the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy 
rules in this research area. 
The agent-based business cycle model employed in our study is quite simple. 
Essentially, we have a Keynesian-type goods market model in which firms’ investment 
expenditure depends on national income expectations. Investment expenditure increases if 
firms expect a boom, and vice versa. A firm forms its expectations on the basis of an 
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extrapolative or a regressive prediction rule, between which the firm dynamically selects with 
respect to predisposition effects, herding behavior and market assessments. Simulations reveal 
that the model is able to produce complex business cycles. We therefore study whether simple 
fiscal policy rules may stabilize the evolution of national income. According to one strategy, 
the central authority increases (decreases) its expenditure if national income is below (above) 
a desired target value. According to the other strategy, it increases (decreases) its expenditure 
if national income decreases (increases). As it turns out, agent-based business cycle models 
give us an idea of how these strategies may affect the dynamics. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a simple agent-based 
financial market model is introduced in which a central authority applies different strategies to 
stabilize the price dynamics. In Section 3, a simple agent-based goods market model is 
proposed in which a central authority relies on different strategies to stabilize the evolution of 
national income. The paper closes with a summary and an outlook. 
 
2 Financial markets 
In this section, we present a simple agent-based financial market model (for surveys see 
Chiarella et al. 2009, Hommes and Wagener 2009, Lux 2009, Westerhoff 2009, Chen et al. 
2012). Since the setup is quite stylized, it may be interpreted as a model for stock markets, 
commodity markets or foreign exchange markets or, more generally, as a model for 
speculative markets. For simplicity, however, we call it a model for financial markets. We 
will use this model to analyze whether a central authority has the ability to stabilize the 
dynamics of financial markets by applying basic intervention strategies. To this end, we 
introduce some statistics that allow us to measure the success or failure of these interventions 
and to check their viability. 
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2.1 A simple agent-based financial market model 
The agent-based financial market model of Franke and Westerhoff (2012) serves as our 
workhorse. In their model, a market maker quotes prices with respect to speculative excess 
demand and the speculators determine their orders following a representative technical or a 
representative fundamental trading rule. According to the technical trading rule, prices move 
in trends and buying (selling) is suggested when prices increase (decrease). The fundamental 
trading rule predicts that prices will return towards their fundamental value. In undervalued 
markets, fundamental trading rules recommend buying and in overvalued markets they 
propose selling. In each time step, speculators have to select one of the two strategies. The 
choice made by speculators depends on three socio-economic principles: a predisposition 
towards one of the two strategies, herding behavior and an evaluation of the current market 
circumstances.  
Since the model of Franke and Westerhoff (2012) has a remarkable ability to match 
some important stylized facts of financial markets, it seems reasonable to use it as an artificial 
laboratory to conduct a number of policy experiments. Therefore, we add a central authority 
to the model. The central authority seeks to stabilize the dynamics by applying simple 
feedback strategies. One intervention strategy aims to push the price towards a desired target 
value. If the target value corresponds with the fundamental value, then the central authority 
trades in the same direction as the fundamentalists. The other strategy seeks to counter the 
behavior of chartists by trading against past price trends. As reported by Neely (2005), such 
strategies are frequently applied by central banks in foreign exchange markets to stabilize 
exchange rate fluctuations. We assume that all interventions by the central authority are 
secret. As a result, speculators cannot strategically exploit the interventions, nor it is clear to 
them that the course of the price is influenced by the central authority. The latter observation 
is important since technical traders may otherwise lose their trust in these price signals. 
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 Let us now turn to the formal part of the model and start with the behavior of the 
market maker. As usual, the market maker collects all individual orders from speculators and 
changes the price with respect to the resulting excess demand. Therefore, we write 
)(1
A
t
F
t
F
t
C
t
C
ttt DDNWDNWaPP  ,                                                                 (1) 
where tP  is the log of the price (at time step t ), a  is a positive price adjustment parameter, 
N  is  the total number of speculators, CtW  is the market share of speculators following a 
technical trading rule, CtD  is the order of a (single) chartist, 
F
tW  is the market share of 
speculators following a fundamental trading rule, FtD  is the order of a (single) 
fundamentalist, and AtD  is the order (intervention) of a central authority. According to (1), 
excess buying drives prices up and excess selling drives them down. Without loss of 
generality, we set the price adjustment parameter to 01.0a  and normalize the population 
size of speculators to 1N . 
 The orders placed by chartists and fundamentalists depend on their price expectations, 
given by ][ 1tCt PE  and ][ 1tFt PE , respectively. If speculators expect a price increase 
(decrease), they buy (sell), as indicated by the first term on the right-hand side of trading rules 
(2) and (3). However, the trading motives of speculators may be more complicated – which is 
why we add random terms to their trading rules. Jointly, this gives us 
C
ttt
C
t
CC
t PPEbD   )][( 10                                                                                            (2) 
and 
F
ttt
F
t
FF
t PPEbD   )][( 10 ,                                                                                      (3) 
where Cb0 and 
Fb0 are positive reaction parameters and ),0(~ 0
CC
t N   and ),0(~ 0FFt N   
are normally distributed random variables with mean zero and constant standard deviation.  
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 Chartists and fundamentalists rely on different expectation formation schemes. Since 
technical analysis predicts that prices move in trends, we express chartists’ expectations as 
C
ttt
C
tt
C
t PPbPPE   )(][ 111 .                                                                       (4) 
Accordingly, chartists pay attention to the most recent price trend, where Cb1 is a positive 
extrapolation parameter. To capture part of the variety of the many existing technical 
prediction rules, we add a normally distributed random variable ),0(~ 1
CC
t N   with mean 
zero and constant standard deviation to (4). 
 In contrast, fundamentalists believe that prices will revert towards their fundamental 
values. Let *P  be the log of the fundamental value, known to all market participants. 
Fundamentalists’ expectations are formalized as 
F
tt
F
tt
F
t PPbPPE  )(][ *11 ,                                                                                  (5) 
with 10 1  Fb  as a mean reversion parameter. Since fundamentalists may display 
digressions from pure mean reversion expectations, we also add a normally distributed 
random variable ),0(~ 1
FF
t N   with mean zero and constant standard deviation to (5).  
Combining (2) and (5), and assuming that the random variables in these equations are 
independent, we obtain the simplified trading rules 
C
ttt
CC
t PPbD   )( 1                                                                                                    (6) 
and 
F
tt
FF
t PPbD  )( * ,                                                                                               (7) 
where CCC bbb 10 , FFF bbb 10 , CtCtCCt b   0  and FtFtFFt b   0 . Obviously, 
),0(~ CCt N   with 20210 )()( CCCC b    and ),0(~ FFt N   with 
2
0
2
10 )()(
FFFF b   . Summing up, chartists follow the current price trend, 
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fundamentalists bet on a fundamental price correction, and both strategies are subject to 
exogenous noise.  
 We now come to the central part of the model. In each time step, speculators have to 
decide which trading rule to follow. This decision depends on the attractiveness of the 
technical and fundamental trading rule, formalized as  
2* )( t
C
m
C
th
C
p
C
t PPcWccA                                                                                         (8) 
and 
2* )( t
F
m
F
th
F
p
F
t PPcWccA  .                                                                                   (9) 
First of all, speculators may have a behavioral preference for one of the two trading rules. 
Such a predisposition effect is expressed by parameters Cpc  and 
F
pc . Second, speculators may 
follow the crowd. The attractiveness of a trading rule thus increases with the size of its market 
share. Parameter 0hc  captures the strength of speculators’ herding behavior. Finally, 
speculators may assess market circumstances. Although speculators believe in the persistence 
of bubbles, they know that all bubbles will eventually burst. In particular, speculators perceive 
a higher probability that a fundamental price correction is about to set in if the price deviates 
from its fundamental value. How sensitively the attractiveness of the two trading rules reacts 
to distortions is controlled by parameters 0Cmc  and 0Fmc . 
To reduce the number of parameters, we compute from (8) and (9) a relative 
attractiveness function 
2* )()( tm
C
t
F
thp
C
t
F
tt PPcWWccAAA  ,                                                    (10) 
where Cp
F
pp ccc   and CmFmm ccc  . In short, the relative attractiveness of 
fundamentalism over chartism depends on speculators’ predisposition, herding behavior and 
market assessment. 
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 The market shares of speculators following the representative technical trading rule 
and the representative fundamental trading rule are determined by 
][1
1
)]([
1
][][
][
11111
1


 tCtFtFtCt
C
tC
t dAExpAAdExpdAExpdAExp
dAExp
W                            (11) 
and 
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1
][][
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11111
1


 tCtFtFtCt
F
tF
t dAExpAAdExpdAExpdAExp
dAExp
W .                 (12) 
Parameter 0d  is the so-called sensitivity of choice parameter. Since d  is a scaling 
parameter in this model, it can, without loss of generality, be set to 1d . Equations (11) and 
(12) imply that if the relative attractiveness of fundamentalism over chartism increases, the 
market share of chartists decreases and the market share of fundamentalists increases. In this 
sense, speculators exhibit a kind of learning behavior. 
To be able to understand the basic functioning of the model, we abstain for the 
moment from involving interventions by a central authority, i.e. we impose 
0AtD .                                                                                                                               (13) 
In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, we introduce simple feedback strategies that may or may not stabilize 
the model dynamics. 
Since we assume that the log fundamental value is equal to zero in all simulations, i.e. 
0* P , seven parameters remain to be specified. Franke and Westerhoff (2012) apply the 
Method of Simulated Moments to estimate these parameters and obtain the following results 
500.1Cb , 147.2C , 120.0Fb , 708.0F , 
336.0pc , 839.1hc , 671.19mc . 
In general terms, the idea behind the Method of Simulated Moments is to match a predefined 
set of summary statistics, or moments, that capture the main stylized facts of financial markets 
(for a review of the properties of financial markets see Lux and Ausloos 2002, Sornette 2003, 
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and Shiller 2005). For this reason, the model parameters are determined via a multi-
dimensional grid search such that the moments of a simulated time series come close to the 
moments of a real financial market time series. What is meant by “close” has to be specified 
by an objective function. Here it suffices to note that the current model produces – in a 
quantitatively acceptable manner – excess volatility, fat tails for the distribution of returns, 
uncorrelated price changes, volatility clustering and long memory effects which, according to 
Chen et al. (2012), belong to the most prominent stylized facts of financial markets.  
 Figure 1 depicts a representative simulation run. Since the model is calibrated to daily 
data, the 5000 observations displayed correspond to a time span of about 20 years. The top 
panel shows the evolution of log prices. In the long run, prices fluctuate around the 
fundamental value. In the short run, however, prices may deviate substantially from the 
fundamental value and exhibit severe bubbles and crashes. Despite these long-run price 
swings, the day-to-day evolution of prices resembles a random walk. The third panel contains 
the corresponding return time series. Although the fundamental value is constant, price 
changes are substantial on average and include a number of extreme movements. In addition, 
periods in which the market is rather calm alternate with periods in which the market is rather 
volatile. In the fourth panel, the Hill tail index estimator is plotted as a function of the largest 
returns (in percent). At the 5 percent level, for instance, the Hill tail index is given at 3.65, 
which corresponds well to observations in real markets. Finally, the bottom two panels depict 
autocorrelation functions for raw returns and absolute returns, respectively. Whilst returns are 
essentially uncorrelated and price changes are thus virtually unpredictable, the autocorrelation 
coefficients of absolute returns are clearly significant and decay slowly over time, witnessing 
volatility clustering and long memory effects. 
+ + + + + Figure 1 about here + + + + + 
 In a nutshell, the model functions as follows. As revealed by the second panel, 
speculators permanently switch between technical and fundamental analysis. Accordingly, 
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there are periods in which technical traders dominate the market. During these periods, the 
market is highly volatile and significant bubbles may emerge. However, fundamental analysis 
becomes increasingly attractive as bubbles grow. If speculators switch from technical analysis 
to fundamental analysis, then volatility decreases and prices gradually retreat towards their 
fundamental values. Of course, this development decreases the attractiveness of fundamental 
trading and may, together with speculators’ behavioral preference towards technical analysis, 
lead directly to a new wave of chartism and instability. Whilst there is permanent ongoing 
competition between the two trading rules, speculators’ herding behavior lends both regimes a 
degree of persistence, which is responsible for the marked volatility clustering and long 
memory effect.  
 
2.2 Policy objectives 
Since the dynamics of the model is close to the dynamics of actual financial markets, we feel 
confident that we can use it as an artificial laboratory to run a number of policy experiments. 
First of all, however, we have to think about how to define the success or failure of an 
intervention strategy. One advantage of agent-based modeling is that this task is usually quite 
easy, at least in a technical sense. It seems natural to assume that policy-makers prefer prices 
to be relatively stable and to be close to a desired target value, e.g. the fundamental value. In 
addition, we have to check the viability of an intervention strategy. For instance, the central 
authority should not build up a larger position, nor should the size of an intervention be 
unreasonably high. In total, we define four statistics to quantify these aspects. These statistics 
also allow us to compare the consequences of different intervention strategies.  
Let T  be the underlying sample length for the statistics. We measure the variability of 
prices by the average absolute log price change. Expressed in percent, this gives us 
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To quantify the market’s mispricing, one may estimate the average absolute distance between 
log prices and the log fundamental value. However, the central authority’s desired target value 
for the market price may deviate from the fundamental value. Taking this into account, we 
define  


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T
t
t
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T
distortion
1
||
1
100 ,                                                                                           (15) 
where AP  is the desired log target value of the central authority. Hence, this measure 
estimates the average absolute distance between the log price and the central authority’s log 
target value, and is again expressed in percent.  
The application of an intervention strategy should not result in the accumulation of a 
too large position. Therefore, we monitor the growth rate of the central authority’s position by 
calculating 



T
t
A
tDT
growth
1
1
.                                                                                                     (16) 
Ideally, the growth rate is zero. Moreover, we identify the average (absolute) intervention size 
of a strategy by 



T
t
A
tDT
size
1
||
1
.                                                                                                        (17) 
Naturally, other measures, such as the profitability of an intervention strategy, may be 
computed. To limit the analysis, we abstain from such extensions. 
 As we will see, interventions by a central authority will affect the evolution of the 
trading rules’ market shares. Since these market shares are the key to understanding how the 
model operates, we furthermore report 
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and 
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i.e. the average market shares of chartists and fundamentalists. Equipped with these statistics, 
we can now start our policy experiments. 
 
2.3 Targeting long-run fundamentals interventions 
Let us start with a simple and, at least at first sight, plausible intervention strategy. Recall that 
AP  is the central authority’s desired log target value. The central authority may seek to drive 
the price towards the desired target value by submitting buying orders if the price is below the 
target value and by submitting selling orders if it is above the target value. Based on these 
considerations, we obtain the intervention strategy 
)( t
AA
t PPeD  ,                                                                                                             (20) 
where parameter 0e  denotes the central authority’s intervention force. If the central 
authority’s target value is equal to the fundamental value, we call this strategy the (unbiased) 
targeting long-run fundamentals strategy. Otherwise, we call it the (biased) targeting long-run 
fundamentals strategy.  
 Figure 2 illustrates how the (unbiased) targeting long-run fundamentals strategy may 
affect the model dynamics. Figure 2 is constructed in the same way as Figure 1, except that 
we set the central authority’s intervention force to 4.0e . With respect to market stability, 
two aspects become immediately apparent. First, prices are now less disconnected from the 
fundamental value. And indeed, computing the distortion, we find that the average absolute 
distance between the log price and the log target value decreases from 20.2 percent (Figure 1, 
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no interventions) to 13.3 percent (Figure 2, current setup). Second, the price variability has 
increased. The volatility of the time series depicted in Figure 1 is 0.72 percent whilst the 
volatility of the time series depicted in Figure 2 is 0.86 percent.  
How do these changes come about? Of course, by buying when the price is low and 
selling when the price is high, the central authority manages to reduce the distortion. But this 
is not the end of the story. There are indirect effects in addition to this direct effect. These 
indirect effects that become apparent from our computer experiments may amplify or 
diminish the (first) direct effect of the interventions. Comparing the second panel of Figure 1 
with the second panel of Figure 2 reveals that the market share of chartists increases (in 
numbers from 27 percent to 44 percent). By reducing the distortion, the relative attractiveness 
of fundamentalism over chartism decreases. Since the market impact of chartists increases, 
volatility naturally increases. Of course, this offsets part of the central authority’s stabilizing 
interventions. Note that the fat tail property, the unpredictability of prices and the volatility 
clustering phenomenon remain essentially unaffected by interventions. We clarify why it is 
also important to scrutinize these statistics in the sequel.  
+ + + + + Figure 2 about here + + + + + 
 Since the results represented in Figure 2 are just an example, we have to generalize our 
analysis. Figure 3 shows how statistics (14) to (19) depend on the central authority’s 
intervention force. To be precise, parameter e  is increased in 50 discrete steps from 0 to 0.5. 
Moreover, all six statistics are computed, for each of the 50 values of parameter e , as 
averages over 50 simulation runs with 5000 observations each. The results of this exercise, 
which reveal another advantage of agent-based policy analysis – namely the generation of 
vast amounts of data for different policies – may be summarized as follows. Whilst volatility 
continuously increases as the central authority becomes more aggressive, the distortion 
decreases at the same time. Note that the effects are quite significant. Volatility increases 
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from 0.72 percent for 0e  to 1.00 percent for 5.0e  and the distortion, in turn, decreases 
from 20 percent for 0e  to 11 percent for 5.0e . 
 Our model allows these changes to be explained. The market shares of chartists and 
fundamentalists depend on the central authority’s intervention force. As parameter e  
increases from 0 to 0.5, the market share of chartists increases from about 27 percent to 
around 55 percent, implying that the market share of fundamentalists decreases from 
approximately 73 percent to about 45 percent. Due to the presence of more destabilizing 
chartists, the price variability increases. Of course, the reduction in the market share of 
fundamentalists is disadvantageous for the central authority since the orders placed by 
fundamentalists help to drive the price towards the fundamental value. At least for the 
underlying parameter setting, however, the central authority is able to compensate for the loss 
of these orders. In fact, the central authority brings the price closer towards the fundamental 
value. Moreover, it seems that interventions are feasible. At least the position of the central 
authority remains more or less balanced (as the next experiment reveals, this need not always 
be the case). To sum up, the (unbiased) targeting long-run fundamentals strategy turns out to 
be a mixed blessing. Prices may be driven closer towards the fundamental value, yet only at 
the expense of stronger price fluctuations. 
+ + + + + Figure 3 about here + + + + + 
 Let us now suppose that the central authority tries to push prices above the 
fundamental value by raising the log target value to 25.025.0*  PP A . Figure 4 gives us 
an example of what may then happen. The reaction parameter of the central authority is 
4.0e . Apparently, the central authority is able to shift the price dynamics upwards, with a 
few occasional interruptions. It also becomes obvious that the price variability decreases. 
What is going on here? Since the price is now further away from its fundamental value, 
technical analysis appears to be less attractive and more speculators opt for fundamental 
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analysis. As a result, the price variability decreases. However, the impact of fundamentalists 
is not strong enough to push the price towards the fundamental value. According to the 
bottom three panels, the fat tail property, the unpredictability of prices and the volatility 
clustering phenomenon remain more or less unaffected by interventions. 
+ + + + + Figure 4 about here + + + + + 
 Figure 5 explores the impact of this strategy more systematically by varying the 
central authority’s intervention force between 0e  and 5.0e . The design of Figure 5 is as 
in Figure 3, except that 25.025.0*  PP A . At first sight, there may be enthusiasm for 
this strategy. As the intervention force increases, volatility and distortion decrease, which is in 
line with the central authority’s goals. Unfortunately, this strategy will most probably be 
unviable in the long run. Whilst the magnitude of the average size of interventions is 
comparable to that in the previous experiment, the central authority ends up with a massive 
positive position. The reason for this is as follows. On average, fundamentalists now perceive 
an overvalued market and continuously submit selling orders. In order to prevent a price 
decrease, the central authority has to offset these orders and, over time, builds up a significant 
positive position. To sum up, the second strategy also appears to be a mixed blessing. The 
central authority may decrease the variability of prices and may push prices towards a desired 
target value for some time, but eventually it has to abort this policy because its position will 
otherwise become unbounded. 
+ + + + + Figure 5 about here + + + + + 
 
2.4 Leaning against the wind interventions 
Let us now study a different, equally simple intervention strategy. In the previous 
experiments, the central authority attempted to stabilize the dynamics by mimicking the 
behavior of fundamentalists. In the next experiments, the central authority seeks to stabilize 
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the dynamics by countering the behavior of chartists. In the following, the central authority 
thus trades against the current price trend, i.e. it employs the intervention strategy 
)( 1 tt
A
t PPfD   ,                                                                                                              (21) 
where parameter 0f  denotes the central authority’s intervention force. For obvious 
reasons, this strategy is called the leaning against the wind strategy. 
 Figure 6 gives us a first impression of how this strategy may affect the model 
dynamics. The design of Figure 6 is again as in Figure 1 (and as in Figures 2 and 4), except 
that the central authority’s intervention force is now given by 12f . This strategy’s 
performance appears to be rather disappointing. Neither does the price seem to be closer to 
the fundamental value, nor has the variability of prices decreased. Also speculators’ switching 
behavior seems to be unchanged. Inspecting the other three panels, we realize that there is a 
change in the autocorrelation function of the returns. In particular, the autocorrelation 
coefficient of the returns at the first lag is significantly negative, which is unrealistic (we will 
return to this issue in Section 2.5). 
+ + + + + Figure 6 about here + + + + + 
 Unfortunately, Figure 7 gives no cause for greater hope. Overall, the leaning against 
the wind strategy may reduce the distortion somewhat, but at the cost of greater volatility. 
Why is this the case? For low values of parameter f , the central authority indeed offsets part 
of the destabilizing (trend-based) orders of chartists, which may reduce the distortion slightly. 
As a result, the market share of chartists increases to some extent, and with it volatility. 
Moreover, the central authority may itself increase volatility, as its interventions increase 
excess demand. A major problem of the leaning against the wind strategy is that it frequently 
generates trading in the wrong direction. Since financial market returns are essentially 
uncorrelated, it is obviously hard to counter price trends.  
+ + + + + Figure 7 about here + + + + + 
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If the central authority increases its intervention force, its orders eventually 
overcompensate the (trend-based) orders of chartists and start to induce a mean reversion 
effect, which further dampens the distortion. The chartists’ market share and, thus, volatility 
increase. But all in all, the effects are very moderate and almost negligible. From the last two 
panels we see that at least the central authority does not build up a larger position. However, 
the size of its interventions may, for higher values of parameter f , be larger than in the case 
of the two previous experiments. 
 
2.5 Discussion  
We have seen that agent-based models help us to understand how financial markets function 
and to assess the effects of regulatory policies. However, our approach may appear too 
mechanical, which may cause an uneasy feeling. It is therefore time to critically review our 
results. Let us return to the first intervention strategy, i.e. the (unbiased) targeting long-run 
fundamentals strategy. Recall that parameter mc  captures how strongly the relative 
attractiveness of fundamentalism over chartism increases as the price deviates from its 
fundamental value and that this parameter has been estimated for a market environment in 
which there are no such interventions. Now, speculators who observe that mispricing in a 
market decreases substantially over time may change their behavior. In particular, they may 
switch more rapidly to fundamental analysis during the build-up of a bubble, implying, 
technically, that parameter mc  increases. Should this be the case, then there are on average 
more fundamentalists in the market and both volatility and distortion are lower. In this sense, 
the stabilizing effect of this intervention strategy would be underestimated. Of course, 
speculators adapt to market developments in our model – in the form of their strategy 
selection. However, this effect, with constant parameters, may be too weak. 
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 There is also a problem with the second intervention strategy – the (biased) targeting 
long-run fundamentals strategy. Recall that the central authority manages to drive the price 
towards a desired target value. In the short run, our results may be reasonable. But this is not 
the case in the long run. Due to the accumulation of a large open position, the strategy is 
simply not viable. However, speculators may change their behavior. At some point in time, 
speculators ought to realize that prices will not return towards the fundamental value and, as a 
result, may base their strategy selection on the central authority’s target value and not on the 
fundamental value. In addition, speculators who opt for fundamental analysis should then 
condition their orders on the distance between the target value and the current price. Should 
such a learning behavior occur, the impact of the biased intervention strategy becomes more 
or less identical to the impact of the unbiased strategy. A model in which speculators learn 
long-run equilibrium prices may do a better job here. 
The third strategy – the leaning against the wind strategy – is also associated with a 
problem. It is clear from the penultimate panel of Figure 6 that the central authority introduces 
a correlation into the price dynamics. To be precise, the autocorrelation coefficient of the 
returns at the first lag is significantly negative. In reality, we would expect speculators to try 
to exploit such a pattern. In particular, technical traders should switch from a trend-
extrapolation strategy to a contrarian strategy. However, the current model is too simple to be 
able to take account of this.  
Also, we learn that it may be dangerous to perform Monte Carlo studies as in Figure 7. 
One should at least inspect some of the time series behind the depicted statistics and check 
whether the model dynamics still makes sense. In case of Figure 7, for instance, the analysis 
should be stopped for values of parameter f  larger than 10 (for values of f  smaller than 10 
the problem with the autocorrelation function does not occur).  
All in all, this gives us clear warnings: agent-based models should not be used too 
mechanically. But since theoretical reasoning, human subject experiments and empirical 
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studies have their challenges, too, agent-based models may nevertheless serve as a valuable 
tool to help policy-makers determine economic policies. Finally, we mention a few other 
applications to illustrate some of the areas that have already been addressed using agent-based 
models: Westerhoff (2001) studies the effects of central bank interventions in foreign 
exchange markets, He and Westerhoff (2005) investigate the impact of price floors and price 
ceilings on agricultural commodity markets, Pellizzari and Westerhoff (2009) explore the 
consequences of transaction taxes, Westerhoff (2003) and Yeh and Jang (2010) are concerned 
with trading halts and price limits, respectively, Hermsen et al. (2010) investigate the role of 
disclosure requirements, Anufriev and Tuinstra (2010) model short-selling constraints, Scalas 
et al. (2005) inspect insider trading and fraudulent behavior, and Brock et al. (2009) examine 
the problems associated with the appearance of an increasing number of hedging instruments 
in financial markets. 
 
3 Goods market 
In this section, we present a simple agent-based goods market model. Note that many agent-
based macro models are inspired by agent-based financial market models. For instance, 
expectations of the market participants play a crucial role in both research fields, and their 
modeling is often quite similar. Since our agent-based goods market model is able to produce 
business cycles, we use it to explore whether simple intervention strategies may stabilize 
fluctuations in economic activity. For this reason, we have to consider again how to quantify 
the success or failure of the interventions and how to check their viability.  
 
3.1 A simple agent-based goods market model 
The model we present in this section stands in the tradition of Samuelson’s (1939) famous 
multiplier-accelerator model. National income adjusts to aggregate demand which, in turn, is 
composed of consumption, investment and governmental expenditures. For simplicity, 
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consumption expenditure is proportional to national income. Following Westerhoff (2006a), 
investment expenditure does not depend on past output changes, as in Samuelson’s (1939) 
model, but on expected future output changes. In the current contribution, firm managers rely 
on two prediction rules to forecast the future course of the economy. If they rely on 
extrapolative expectations, they believe that the current trend of national income is persistent. 
Consequently, they increase their investment expenditure during an upswing and decrease it 
during a downswing. If they rely on regressive expectations, they believe that national income 
will return to its long-run equilibrium value. As a result, they increase their investment 
expenditure if national income falls below this value and decrease it otherwise. Firm 
managers select their prediction rule at the beginning of every period, namely with respect to 
predisposition effects, herding behavior and market circumstances. The use of extrapolative 
and regressive expectations as well as switching behavior between them is well documented 
in empirical studies (Branch 2004 and Hommes 2011).  
Since the model is able to produce business cycles, we use it as an artificial laboratory 
to study two common intervention strategies. According to one strategy – the trend-offsetting 
strategy – the government aims at offsetting income trends and thus increases (decreases) its 
spending when national income has just fallen (risen). According to the other strategy – the 
level-adjusting strategy – the government seeks to reduce the gap between the actual level of 
national income and a desired target value. Government expenditure is thus high (low) if 
national income is below (above) the target value. Note that Baumol (1961) already studies 
the effects of these two strategies using Samuelson’s original model.  
Let us now turn to the details of the model (we apply a new notation). National income 
adjusts to aggregate demand with a one-period production lag. If aggregate demand exceeds 
(falls short of) production, then production increases (decreases). Therefore, we write 
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)(1 tttt YZaYY  ,                                                                                                        (22) 
where tY  represents national income (at time step t ), tZ  denotes aggregate demand and a  
indicates the goods market’s adjustment speed. For simplicity, we set 1a . As a result, 
national income at time step 1t  equals aggregate demand at time step t , i.e. tt ZY 1 . 
 Since our focus is on a closed economy, aggregate demand is defined as  
tttt GICZ  ,                                                                                                                 (23) 
where tC , tI  and tG  stand for consumption, (gross) investment and governmental 
expenditure, respectively. 
 Consumers’ expenditure is proportional to national income 
tt bYC  .                                                                                                                              (24) 
The marginal propensity to consume is limited to 10  b . Of course, much more interesting 
specifications including, for instance, income expectations and/or consumer sentiment effects 
may be assumed in (24).  
 The interesting part of the model concerns firms’ investment behavior. Firms are 
boundedly rational and select between two representative investment rules. Aggregate 
investment expenditures are given as 
F
t
F
t
C
t
C
tt INWINWI  ,         (25) 
where N  is the number of firms, CtW  is the market share of firms with extrapolative 
expectations, CtI  is the investment expenditure of a single firm with extrapolative 
expectations, FtW  is the market share of firms with regressive expectations and 
F
tI  is the 
investment expenditure of a single firm with regressive expectations (we stick to the labels C 
and F to represent the two different kinds of behavior). To simplify matters, we normalize the 
population size of firms to 1N . 
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 Both (representative) investment rules depend on three components: an autonomous 
component, an expectations-based component and a random component. These are formalized 
as 
C
ttt
C
t
CCC
t YYEiII   )][( 10                                                                                   (26) 
and 
F
ttt
F
t
FFF
t YYEiII   )][( 10 .                                                                                   (27) 
Autonomous investments are denoted by CI  and FI . Parameters 00 Ci  and 00 Fi  
indicate how strongly investment expenditures react to expected changes in national income, 
and ),0(~ 0
CC
t N   and ),0(~ 0FFt N   reflect additional random influences.  
 Firm managers either form extrapolative or regressive expectations. Extrapolative 
expectations are given by 
C
ttt
C
tt
C
t YYiYYE   )(][ 111 ,                                                                              (28) 
where Ci1  is a positive extrapolation parameter. The random variable ),0(~ 1
CC
t N   allows 
for digressions from purely trend-based expectations. Regressive expectations result in 
F
tt
F
tt
F
t YYiYYE  )(][ *11 .                                                                             (29) 
Followers of the regressive rule expect national income to return to its long-run equilibrium 
level, perceived as *Y , at adjustment speed 10 1  Fi . Random deviations from this principle 
are summarized by the random variable ),0(~ 1
FF
t N  . 
Combining (26) to (29) and assuming that the random variables in these equations are 
independent, we obtain the simplified investment functions 
C
ttt
CC
t YYiII   )( 1                                                                                              (30) 
and 
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F
tt
FF
t YYiII   )( 1* ,                                                                                       (31) 
where FC III  , CCC iii 10 , FFF iii 10 , CtCtCCt i   0  and FtFtFFt i   0 .  Note 
that ),0(~ CCt N   with 20210 )()( CCCC i    and that ),0(~ FFt N   with 
2
0
2
10 )()(
FFFF i   . 
 How do firms select their investment rules? Analogous to the financial market model, 
we assume that firms compare the attractiveness of the rules and that the mass of them select 
the most attractive investment rule. Let us first discuss the attractiveness of the rules, which 
are defined as 
2* )( t
C
m
C
th
C
p
C
t YYcWccA                                                                                     (32) 
and 
2* )( t
F
m
F
th
F
p
F
t YYcWccA  .                                                                                    (33) 
Accordingly, firms may have different behavioral preferences for the rules, indicated by 
parameters Cpc  and 
F
pc . In addition, firms may be sensitive to herding dynamics, where 
parameter 0hc  controls the strength of this effect. Finally, firms assess current market 
circumstances. The more extreme the business cycle becomes, the more attractive the 
regressive forecasting rule appears to them. Parameters 0Cmc  and 0Fmc  calibrate how 
quickly firms switch from extrapolative to regressive expectations as the business cycle 
develops. 
 We employ a relative attractiveness function to reduce the number of parameters. 
Taking the difference between (33) and (32) yields 
2* )()( tm
C
t
F
thp
C
t
F
tt YYcWWccAAA  ,                                                     (34) 
where Cp
F
pp ccc   and CmFmm ccc  . To sum up, the relative attractiveness of regressive 
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expectations over extrapolative expectations depends on firms’ predisposition, herding 
behavior and market assessment. 
 The market shares of firms forming extrapolative and regressive expectations is 
formalized by 
][1
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Parameter 0d  describes how sensitively firms react to changes in the investment rules’ 
relative attractiveness. Again we set, without loss of generality, 1d . 
For the moment, governmental expenditure is constant, i.e.  
GGt  ,                                                                                                                                 (37) 
where 0G . In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we discuss the impact of countercyclical intervention 
strategies on the model dynamics and their long-run viability.  
 Firm managers believe that the long-run equilibrium value of national income is given 
by the Keynesian multiplier solution, i.e. )1/()(* bGIY  . In total, therefore, ten 
parameters remain to be specified. We choose:  
9.0b , 3.0I , 4.1Ci , 015.0C , 8.0Fi , 015.0F , 2.0G , 
45.0pc , 2.1hc , 500mc . 
This time, we selected the model parameters by hand such that the dynamics of the model 
resembles actual business cycles, at least to some degree. Obviously, a calibration approach is 
more informal than an estimation approach, such as the use of the Method of Simulated 
Moments in the previous example. One should therefore be careful when interpreting the 
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results. Whilst quantitative statements are virtually impossible to justify, qualitative reasoning 
may nevertheless be possible.   
 Figure 8 contains an example of the model dynamics. The depicted time series last 100 
periods which should be interpreted as a time span of 100 years. The top panel shows that 
national income oscillates around 5* Y  (horizontal gray line) and that business cycles last, 
on average, around eight years. The second, third and fifth panels depict the paths of 
consumption, investment and governmental expenditure, respectively. Note that the first three 
time series evolve procyclically, as is the case in reality. In addition, the magnitude of 
consumption changes and investment changes are roughly comparable. Since total investment 
expenditure is lower than total consumption expenditure, the relative variability of investment 
expenditure is larger than the relative variability of consumption expenditure (empirical 
properties of actual business cycles are summarized in Stock and Watson 1999). Although the 
power of the model should not be overstated, given its simplicity it does the job adequately. 
+ + + + + Figure 8 about here + + + + + 
 The penultimate panel of Figure 8 presents the market shares of extrapolating firms 
and helps us to comprehend how the model functions. If the majority of firms opt for 
extrapolative expectations, the economy is unstable and national income drifts away from its 
long-run equilibrium value. As a result, the attractiveness of regressive expectations increases. 
Since more and more firms turn to regressive expectations, the economy becomes stabilized 
and national income returns towards its long-run equilibrium value. Due to the prevailing 
conditions and firms’ behavioral preference for extrapolative expectations, the economy, 
however, receives its next destabilizing impulse. This pattern repeats itself in a more or less 
complex manner. For instance, herding effects may easily prolong stable and unstable periods, 
thereby affecting the amplitude and frequency of business cycles.  
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Despite the random shocks, there is still some regularity in the business cycles, in 
particular in the first 50 periods. We briefly add here that, in the absence of exogenous 
shocks, our deterministic goods market model produces quasi-periodic dynamics whilst our 
deterministic financial market model is characterized by fixed point dynamics. However, both 
models are highly nonlinear and exogenous shocks trigger irregular transients.  
  
3.2 Policy objectives 
We introduce four statistics to evaluate the success of the intervention strategies. It seems 
reasonable to assume that policy-makers prefer national income to be relatively stable and 
close to a desired target value. In addition, the interventions should on average be balanced 
and the size of the interventions should be not too large. The sample length for which we 
compute these statistics is again given by T . 
The variability of national income is measured by its average absolute relative change. 
Expressed in percent, we have 

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Let AY  be the policy-makers’ desired target value for national income. In this sense, a natural 
measure for an “undesired” output gap, also expressed in percent, is  
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Since the policy-makers aim at a balanced net position, we report the growth rate of their 
position by calculating 
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.                                                                                                        (40) 
In addition, the average (absolute) size of an intervention strategy is given by  
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Note that by subtracting G  in (40) and (41), these two measures take only the active part of 
the intervention strategies into account. Although, of course, other measures may be 
computed, we abstain from such extensions. 
 We also keep track of the average market shares of the two investment rules by 
defining 
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These statistics are again the key to understanding how the model functions. 
 
3.3 Level-adjusting interventions 
The first rule we explore is the so-called level-adjusting rule. According to this rule, the 
government increases (decreases) its expenditure if national income is below (above) its 
desired target value in the hope that national income will thereby be pushed upwards 
(downwards). Formally, we have 
)( t
A
t YYeGG  ,                                                                                                            (44) 
where parameter 0e  indicates the government’s aggressiveness. In analogy to the financial 
market examples, let us refer to an (unbiased) level-adjusting rule if the government’s target 
value is equal to *Y , i.e. to the long-run equilibrium value of national income as perceived by 
firms, and to a (biased) level-adjusting rule otherwise.  
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 Figure 9 illustrates how an (unbiased) level-adjusting rule may affect the model 
dynamics. The design of Figure 9 is as in Figure 8, except that 5.0e  and 5AY . A 
comparison of Figures 8 and 9 reveals that the interventions reduce the amplitude of business 
cycles but simultaneously increase their frequency. Whilst this placates consumption 
expenditures, investment expenditure appears to be more volatile. What is going on here? By 
increasing expenditure when national income is low and decreasing it when national income 
is high, the government indeed manages to drive national income closer to 5* YY A . On 
average, however, extrapolative expectations now appear more attractive to firms. Since the 
central authority also reverses the course of national income more frequently via its 
interventions, the length of business cycles is shortened. 
+ + + + + Figure 9 about here + + + + + 
Figure 10 captures the effects of (unbiased) level-adjusting interventions in more 
detail by showing how our policy measures respond to stronger intervention forces. In Figure 
10, parameter e  is increased in 50 discrete steps from 0 to 1 and all statistics are computed as 
averages over 50 simulation runs with 5000 observations each. The main results are as 
follows. First of all, volatility increases, i.e. national income changes more strongly if the 
government reacts more aggressively. The good news is that the distortion decreases, i.e. the 
government manages to drive national income closer towards its target value. For 0e , for 
instance, the distortion is about 0.43 percent whilst for 1e  it is only about 0.33 percent, a 
reduction of about one fourth. 
Note that firms switch from regressive expectations to extrapolative expectations as 
parameter e  increases. This change is most likely to dampen the stabilizing effect of 
(unbiased) level-adjusting interventions, contributing to greater volatility. As indicated by the 
bottom two panels of Figure 10, the government’s average net position is close to zero, yet the 
size of its interventions increases with intervention force. To put the numbers into perspective, 
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for 6.0e , for instance, the average size of the interventions is about 0.01, which 
corresponds to a stimulus of 0.2 percent of national income per year, a number which should 
be accomplishable. 
+ + + + + Figure 10 about here + + + + + 
Figure 11 presents a simulation run for the (biased) level-adjusting rule. The design of 
Figure 11 is as in Figure 8, except that 5.0e  and 05.5AY  (i.e. the target value of the 
government is one percent above 5* Y ). Obviously, the government manages to increase 
the average level of national income. In addition, whilst the amplitude of business cycles has 
decreased, the frequency of business cycles is higher than before (see Figure 8). Also the 
relevance of extrapolative expectations has diminished. 
+ + + + + Figure 11 about here + + + + + 
Let us inspect Figure 12 to understand what is happening here. By supporting the 
target value 05.5AY , the average level of national income increases and thus the distortion 
decreases. Moreover, more firms now rely on regressive expectations. Since this creates a 
downward pressure for national income (investment expenditures based on regressive 
expectations are lower), the government has to stimulate the economy in most time steps. 
Indeed, as revealed by the bottom left panel of Figure 12, the government’s average net 
position is no longer neutral and, over time, this strategy is virtually unviable (although the 
average absolute size of the interventions is roughly comparable to the previous strategy). For 
completeness, note that there is also a slight increase in volatility.  
+ + + + + Figure 12 about here + + + + + 
 
3.4 Trend-offsetting interventions 
The last strategy we investigate is a so-called trend-offsetting strategy, given by  
)( 1 ttt YYfGG   .                                                                                                          (44) 
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Since f  is a positive parameter, the government increases its expenditure if national income 
decreases, and vice versa. 
 Figure 13 depicts how this strategy may affect the dynamics. The difference between 
Figure 8 and Figure 13 is that 0f  in Figure 8 whilst 5.0f  in Figure 13. Interestingly, we 
may finally have a strategy that is capable of stabilizing the dynamics. As suggested by the 
first panel of Figure 13, both the amplitude and the frequency of business cycles decrease due 
to the interventions. Although more firms now rely on extrapolative expectations, changes in 
national income have not increased. Of course, a government that manages to weaken the 
trend of national income automatically tames the destabilizing impact of extrapolative 
expectations. 
+ + + + + Figure 13 about here + + + + + 
Figure 14 confirms these promising results. If the government increases its 
intervention force, then volatility and distortion decrease. Whilst the market share of firms 
forming regressive expectations decreases, the dynamics nevertheless becomes stabilized. As 
already mentioned, the destabilizing impact of extrapolative expectations decreases if trends 
in the business cycle decrease. But why does this strategy work in the business cycle model 
but not in the financial market model? Recall that price changes are unpredictable in the 
financial market model and a central authority that trades in the direction of the most recent 
price trend trades with a probability of 50 percent in the direction of the current price trend. In 
case of business cycles, the government makes errors less frequently. The intervention by the 
government only goes with the trend at the turning point of a business cycle. Otherwise it 
effectively counters the trend. 
+ + + + + Figure 14 about here + + + + + 
 
3.5 Discussion  
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Let us critically review the results of the last two sections and start with the (unbiased) level-
adjusting strategy. By changing the features of business cycles, firms may be expected to 
adjust their behavior. In our model, firms adjust their behavior via the selection process of the 
prediction rules. If the attractiveness of regressive expectations decreases, for instance, firms 
will opt for extrapolative expectations more frequently. However, the way in which firms 
perceive the attractiveness of the prediction rules remains constant (the parameters are fixed). 
One may expect in reality that if the amplitude of business cycles decreases, firms will take 
this into account and will consequently switch earlier towards regressive expectations during 
the build-up of a boom or recession. This would presumably further stabilize the dynamics, 
i.e. we may currently underestimate the effectiveness of this strategy. 
 What about the (biased) level-adjusting strategy? If firms realize that national income 
fluctuates above their perceived long-run equilibrium value, they should take this observation 
into account when selecting their prediction rules and forming their expectations. In our 
simple model, this is not the case. If firms did this, the results of the (biased) strategy would 
ultimately converge towards the results of the (unbiased) strategy. On the other hand, learning 
in a macroeconomic context may take a considerable length of time. For instance, the duration 
of three business cycles, after which a permanent change in the level of national income may 
become apparent, may last 25 years. From this perspective, this aspect should presumably not 
be regarded as too critical. The illustrated results may be reasonable for a few years, at least, 
albeit at the cost that the government’s position becomes non-neutral. 
 The trend-offsetting strategy faces a similar problem as the (unbiased) level-adjusting 
strategy. In the end, firms will realize that the amplitude of business cycles has declined and 
will thus adapt their behavior. If they switch more rapidly to regressive expectations, the 
dynamics may even be more stabilized. On the other hand, note that the effectiveness of this 
strategy depends on the regularity of business cycles. The more irregular business cycles are, 
the less effective the trend-offsetting strategy will be. Since actual business cycles may be 
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more irregular than the business cycles in Figure 8, we may be overstating the functioning of 
the trend-offsetting strategy.  
Small-scale agent-based macro models are currently emerging; there are not yet many 
policy applications. Nevertheless, further examples include Westerhoff (2006b), Brazier et al. 
(2008), Westerhoff and Hohnisch (2010), de Grauwe (2010), Lines and Westerhoff (2010, 
2012) and Anufriev et al. (2012). Finally, some authors have started to connect agent-based 
models from the real sector with agent-based financial market models. This research area 
seems to be promising, also with a view to policy applications. Examples include Lengnick 
and Wohltmann (2012) and Westerhoff (2012). 
 
4 Summary and outlook 
Agent-based modeling may serve as a valuable tool for economic policy analysis in addition 
to theoretical reasoning, human subject experiments and empirical studies. In this 
contribution, we review the extent to which agent-based models are currently suitable for 
evaluating the effectiveness of certain regulatory policies. As our analysis shows, agent-based 
modeling is associated with a number of natural advantages, some of which are mentioned 
here: 
- Agent-based models give us fresh insights into how economic systems function and, 
thereby, how regulatory policies may shape their dynamics. For instance, regulatory policies 
frequently have an obvious direct effect, but their indirect effects are often much less clear. 
By disentangling direct effects and indirect effects, agent-based models help us to grasp the 
impact of regulatory policies in more detail. Agent-based models also reveal the limits of 
regulatory policies. We can learn what to expect and what not to expect from regulatory 
policies. 
- Agent-based models can also be used to pre-test the effectiveness of newly proposed 
policies. Moreover, we can even use agent-based models to improve these policies or to 
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design alternative policies. For instance, an agent-based model may reveal that a nonlinear 
intervention rule does a better job of stabilizing markets than its linear counterpart.  
- Agent-based models enable us to control for all exogenous shocks and to simulate extreme 
events. If we are interested in how a certain policy works during a particular type of crisis, 
say a dramatic downward shift of the equilibrium value of national income, we may simply 
add such a crisis to our analysis.  
- Agent-based models allow us to generate as much data as necessary. Compared to empirical 
studies and human subject experiments where data is typically limited (or simply not 
available), modern computers enable vast amounts of observations to be computed. This is 
quite important: due to the appearance of infrequent market frenzies, many statistics such as 
volatility measures converge relatively slowly and wrong conclusions may be drawn if the 
data is collected in a rather calm or turbulent period. 
- Agent-based models enable all variables to be measured precisely. In reality, it is often 
difficult to identify the exact equilibrium value of a financial market or of the real economy. 
In agent-based models, this task is usually quite simple. Other variables, such as 
expectations and/or transactions of market participants, may also be recorded. 
- In agent-based models, the intensity of a policy can be varied smoothly. In contrast, many 
empirical studies are based on periods in which a policy with a constant strength was 
applied. By gradually increasing the intensity of a policy, agent-based models may reveal 
nontrivial effects that are precluded at coarser scales. Other types of sensitivity analysis, 
such as the use of different model parameters or functional specifications of the model’s 
building blocks, are also possible. 
Of course, the starting point of the analysis should always be an appropriate agent-
based model. The appropriateness of the underlying model decides whether results are 
obtained that are interesting from a quantitative perspective, as in our financial market 
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example, or which have a more qualitative outlook, as in our goods market example. In this 
respect, three aspects deserve attention: 
- First, the model ideally possesses an empirical microfoundation, meaning that its main 
building blocks should be supported by empirical evidence. For instance, speculators’ use of 
technical and fundamental analysis, as assumed in our agent-based financial market model, 
is well documented in the empirical literature. At first sight, the setup of agent-based models 
may seem ad hoc to outsiders. In our view, however, this is not the case, at least not as long 
as the models’ main building blocks are in line with reality.   
- Second, the internal functioning of the underlying model should be convincing. For 
instance, complex dynamics emerge in our agent-based financial market model since 
speculators switch between destabilizing technical trading rules and stabilizing fundamental 
trading rules. Bubbles are thus initiated by a wave of chartism and crashes are triggered by a 
surge of fundamentalism. Clearly, it would not sound very plausible if this were the other 
way around.   
- Third, the data generated by the model should be as realistic as possible. In particular, an 
agent-based model should be able to mimic the main stylized facts of a market for which it 
is developed. Here it is encouraging to see that more and more agent-based models are 
being estimated rather than merely calibrated (by hand), which lends these models a 
considerable amount of additional support. 
If these requirements are fulfilled, agent-based models may be well suitable for 
conducting policy experiments. The following steps have to be considered: 
- One important task is to define a set of measures that allow a policy’s success or failure to 
be evaluated. However, it is equally important to determine whether a policy is viable in the 
long run. A policy that is able to stabilize the markets but causes unsustainable costs is 
obviously of not much use. 
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- Moreover, a policy has to be properly implemented in the agent-based model. In our two 
examples, the intervention policies alter the markets’ excess demands. Other policies may 
affect the attractiveness of the market participants’ strategies or other model components. 
Fortunately, agent-based models are relatively flexible in this respect, yet this modeling 
aspect is crucial and should not be underestimated. 
- Finally, we have seen that it may be dangerous to apply agent-based models too 
mechanically. It is thus vital to check whether the agents’ behavior still makes sense after 
the imposition of a new policy and whether the resulting dynamics is still reasonable.  
To conclude, our economy is a complex adaptive system and nonlinearities often make 
it very difficult to anticipate the consequences of regulatory policies. The use of agent-based 
models offers us insights into the functioning of economic systems that are otherwise 
precluded. We are convinced that agent-based models are an excellent tool for enhancing our 
understanding of regulatory policies, in particular, if they are empirically supported, and look 
forward to more exciting research in this area. 
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Figure 1: The dynamics of the agent-based financial market model without regulations. 
Parameter setting as in Section 2. 
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Figure 2: The dynamics of the agent-based financial market model with (unbiased) targeting 
long-run fundamentals interventions. Parameter setting as in Figure 1. In addition, 
parameter 4.0e  and log target price 0AP . 
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Figure 3: Some effects of (unbiased) targeting long-run fundamentals interventions. Parameter 
setting as in Figure 1. In addition, parameter e  is increased from 0 to 0.5 and the log target 
price is 0AP . 
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Figure 4: The dynamics of the agent-based financial market model with (biased) targeting 
long-run fundamentals interventions. Parameter setting as in Figure 1. In addition, parameter 
4.0e  and log target price 25.0AP . 
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Figure 5: Some effects of biased targeting long-run fundamentals interventions. Parameter 
setting as in Figure 1. In addition, parameter e  is increased from 0 to 0.5 and the log target 
price is 25.0AP .  
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Figure 6: The dynamics of the financial market model with leaning against the wind 
interventions. Parameter setting as in Figure 1. In addition, parameter 12f  and log target 
price 0AP . 
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Figure 7: Some effects of leaning against the wind interventions. Parameter setting as in 
Figure 1. In addition, parameter f  is increased from 0 to 20 and the log target rate is 0AP . 
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Figure 8: The dynamics of the agent-based goods market model without regulations. 
Parameter setting as in Section 3. 
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Figure 9: The dynamics of the agent-based goods market model with (unbiased) level-
adjusting interventions. Parameter setting as in Figure 8. In addition, parameter 4.0e  and 
target value of national income 5AY . 
 
 
51 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Some effects of (unbiased) level-adjusting interventions. Parameter setting as in 
Figure 8. In addition, parameter e  is increased from 0 to 1 and the target value of national 
income is 5AY . 
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Figure 11: The dynamics of the agent-based goods market model with (unbiased) level-
adjusting interventions. Parameter setting as in Figure 8. In addition, parameter 4.0e  and 
target rate of national income 05.5AY . 
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Figure 12: Some effects of (biased) level-adjusting interventions. Parameter setting as in 
Figure 8. In addition, parameter e  is increased from 0 to 1 and the target rate of national 
income is 05.5AY .  
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Figure 13: The dynamics of the agent-based goods market model with trend-offsetting 
interventions. Parameter setting as in Figure 8. In addition, parameter 5.0f  and target rate 
of national income 5AY . 
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Figure 14: Some effects of trend-offsetting interventions. Parameter setting as in Figure 8. In 
addition, parameter f  is increased from 0 to 0.8 and the target rate of national income is 
5AY . 
BERG Working Paper Series 
 
1 Mikko Puhakka and Jennifer P. Wissink, Multiple Equilibria and Coordination Failure 
in Cournot Competition, December 1993 
2 Matthias Wrede, Steuerhinterziehung und endogenes Wachstum, December 1993 
3 Mikko Puhakka, Borrowing Constraints and the Limits of Fiscal Policies, May 1994 
4 Gerhard Illing, Indexierung der Staatsschuld und die Glaubwürdigkeit der Zentralbank in 
einer Währungsunion, June 1994 
5 Bernd Hayo, Testing Wagner`s Law for Germany from 1960 to 1993, July 1994 
6 Peter Meister and Heinz-Dieter Wenzel, Budgetfinanzierung in einem föderalen System, 
October 1994 
7 Bernd Hayo and Matthias Wrede, Fiscal Policy in a Keynesian Model of a Closed Mon-
etary Union, October 1994 
8 Michael Betten, Heinz-Dieter Wenzel, and Matthias Wrede, Why Income Taxation 
Need Not Harm Growth, October 1994 
9 Heinz-Dieter Wenzel (Editor), Problems and Perspectives of the Transformation Process 
in Eastern Europe, August 1995 
10 Gerhard Illing, Arbeitslosigkeit aus Sicht der neuen Keynesianischen Makroökonomie, 
September 1995 
11 Matthias Wrede, Vertical and horizontal tax competition: Will uncoordinated Leviathans 
end up on the wrong side of the Laffer curve? December 1995 
12 Heinz-Dieter Wenzel and Bernd Hayo, Are the fiscal Flows of the European Union 
Budget explainable by Distributional Criteria? June 1996 
13 Natascha Kuhn, Finanzausgleich in Estland: Analyse der bestehenden Struktur und 
Überlegungen für eine Reform, June 1996 
14 Heinz-Dieter Wenzel, Wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsperspektiven Turkmenistans, July 
1996 
15 Matthias Wrede, Öffentliche Verschuldung in einem föderalen Staat; Stabilität, vertikale 
Zuweisungen und Verschuldungsgrenzen, August 1996 
16 Matthias Wrede, Shared Tax Sources and Public Expenditures, December 1996 
17 Heinz-Dieter Wenzel and Bernd Hayo, Budget and Financial Planning in Germany, Feb-
ruary 1997 
18 Heinz-Dieter Wenzel, Turkmenistan: Die ökonomische Situation und Perspektiven wirt-
schaftlicher Entwicklung, February 1997 
19 Michael Nusser, Lohnstückkosten und internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit: Eine kriti-
sche Würdigung, April 1997 
20 Matthias Wrede, The Competition and Federalism - The Underprovision of Local Public 
Goods, September 1997 
21 Matthias Wrede, Spillovers, Tax Competition, and Tax Earmarking, September 1997 
22 Manfred Dauses, Arsène Verny, Jiri Zemánek, Allgemeine Methodik der Rechtsanglei-
chung an das EU-Recht am Beispiel der Tschechischen Republik, September 1997 
23 Niklas Oldiges, Lohnt sich der Blick über den Atlantik? Neue Perspektiven für die aktu-
elle Reformdiskussion an deutschen Hochschulen, February 1998 
24 Matthias Wrede, Global Environmental Problems and Actions Taken by Coalitions, May 
1998 
25 Alfred Maußner, Außengeld in berechenbaren Konjunkturmodellen – Modellstrukturen 
und numerische Eigenschaften, June 1998 
26 Michael Nusser, The Implications of Innovations and Wage Structure Rigidity on Eco-
nomic Growth and Unemployment: A Schumpetrian Approach to Endogenous Growth 
Theory, October 1998 
27 Matthias Wrede, Pareto Efficiency of the Pay-as-you-go Pension System in a Three-
Period-OLG Modell, December 1998 
28 Michael Nusser, The Implications of Wage Structure Rigidity on Human Capital Accu-
mulation, Economic Growth and Unemployment: A Schumpeterian Approach to Endog-
enous Growth Theory, March 1999 
29 Volker Treier, Unemployment in Reforming Countries: Causes, Fiscal Impacts and the 
Success of Transformation, July 1999 
30 Matthias Wrede, A Note on Reliefs for Traveling Expenses to Work, July 1999 
31 Andreas Billmeier, The Early Years of Inflation Targeting – Review and Outlook –, Au-
gust 1999 
32 Jana Kremer, Arbeitslosigkeit und Steuerpolitik, August 1999 
33 Matthias Wrede, Mobility and Reliefs for Traveling Expenses to Work, September 1999 
34 Heinz-Dieter Wenzel (Herausgeber), Aktuelle Fragen der Finanzwissenschaft, February 
2000 
35 Michael Betten, Household Size and Household Utility in Intertemporal Choice, April 
2000 
36 Volker Treier, Steuerwettbewerb in Mittel- und Osteuropa: Eine Einschätzung anhand 
der Messung effektiver Grenzsteuersätze, April 2001 
37 Jörg Lackenbauer und Heinz-Dieter Wenzel, Zum Stand von Transformations- und EU-
Beitrittsprozess in Mittel- und Osteuropa – eine komparative Analyse, May 2001 
38 Bernd Hayo und Matthias Wrede, Fiscal Equalisation: Principles and an Application to 
the European Union, December 2001 
39  Irena Dh. Bogdani, Public Expenditure Planning in Albania, August 2002 
40  Tineke Haensgen, Das Kyoto Protokoll: Eine ökonomische Analyse unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der flexiblen Mechanismen, August 2002 
41  Arben Malaj and Fatmir Mema, Strategic Privatisation, its Achievements and Challeng-
es, Januar 2003 
42 Borbála Szüle 2003, Inside financial conglomerates, Effects in the Hungarian pension 
fund market, January 2003 
43 Heinz-Dieter Wenzel und Stefan Hopp (Herausgeber), Seminar Volume of the Second 
European Doctoral Seminar (EDS), February 2003 
44 Nicolas Henrik Schwarze, Ein Modell für Finanzkrisen bei Moral Hazard und Überin-
vestition, April 2003 
45 Holger Kächelein, Fiscal Competition on the Local Level – May commuting be a source 
of fiscal crises?, April 2003 
46 Sibylle Wagener, Fiskalischer Föderalismus – Theoretische Grundlagen und Studie Un-
garns, August 2003 
47 Stefan Hopp, J.-B. Say’s 1803 Treatise and the Coordination of Economic Activity, July 
2004 
48 Julia Bersch, AK-Modell mit Staatsverschuldung und fixer Defizitquote, July 2004 
49 Elke Thiel, European Integration of Albania: Economic Aspects, November 2004 
50 Heinz-Dieter Wenzel, Jörg Lackenbauer, and Klaus J. Brösamle, Public Debt and the 
Future of the EU's Stability and Growth Pact, December 2004 
51 Holger Kächelein, Capital Tax Competition and Partial Cooperation: Welfare Enhancing 
or not? December 2004 
52 Kurt A. Hafner, Agglomeration, Migration and Tax Competition, January 2005 
53 Felix Stübben, Jörg Lackenbauer und Heinz-Dieter Wenzel, Eine Dekade wirtschaftli-
cher Transformation in den Westbalkanstaaten: Ein Überblick, November 2005 
54 Arben Malaj, Fatmir Mema and Sybi Hida, Albania, Financial Management in the Edu-
cation System: Higher Education, December 2005 
55 Osmat Azzam, Sotiraq Dhamo and Tonin Kola, Introducing National Health Accounts 
in Albania, December 2005 
56  Michael Teig, Fiskalische Transparenz und ökonomische Entwicklung: Der Fall Bosni-
en-Hercegovina, März 2006 
57  Heinz-Dieter Wenzel (Herausgeber), Der Kaspische Raum: Ausgewählte Themen zu 
Politik und Wirtschaft, Juli 2007 
58  Tonin Kola and Elida Liko, An Empirical Assessment of Alternative Exchange Rate 
Regimes in Medium Term in Albania, Januar 2008 
59  Felix Stübben, Europäische Energieversorgung: Status quo und Perspektiven, Juni 2008 
60  Holger Kächelein, Drini Imami and Endrit Lami, A new view into Political Business 
Cycles: Household Expenditures in Albania, July 2008 
61  Frank Westerhoff, A simple agent-based financial market model: direct interactions and 
comparisons of trading profits, January 2009 
62  Roberto Dieci and Frank Westerhoff, A simple model of a speculative housing market, 
February 2009 
63  Carsten Eckel, International Trade and Retailing, April 2009 
64  Björn-Christopher Witte, Temporal information gaps and market efficiency: a dynamic 
behavioral analysis, April 2009 
65  Patrícia Miklós-Somogyi and László Balogh, The relationship between public balance 
and inflation in Europe (1999-2007), June 2009 
66  H.-Dieter Wenzel und Jürgen Jilke, Der Europäische Gerichtshof EuGH als Bremsklotz 
einer effizienten und koordinierten Unternehmensbesteuerung in Europa?, November 
2009 
67  György Jenei, A Post-accession Crisis? Political Developments and Public Sector Mod-
ernization in Hungary, December 2009 
68  Marji Lines and Frank Westerhoff, Effects of inflation expectations on macroeconomic 
dynamics: extrapolative versus regressive expectations, December 2009 
69  Stevan Gaber, Economic Implications from Deficit Finance, January 2010 
70  Abdulmenaf Bexheti, Anti-Crisis Measures in the Republic of Macedonia and their Ef-
fects – Are they Sufficient?, March 2010 
71  Holger Kächelein, Endrit Lami and Drini Imami, Elections Related Cycles in Publicly 
Supplied Goods in Albania, April 2010 
72  Annamaria Pfeffer, Staatliche Zinssubvention und Auslandsverschuldung: Eine Mittel-
wert-Varianz-Analyse am Beispiel Ungarn, April 2010 
73  Arjan Tushaj, Market concentration in the banking sector: Evidence from Albania, April 
2010 
74  Pál Gervai, László Trautmann and Attila Wieszt, The mission and culture of the corpo-
ration, October 2010 
75  Simone Alfarano and Mishael Milaković, Identification of Interaction Effects in Survey 
Expectations: A Cautionary Note, October 2010 
76  Johannes Kalusche, Die Auswirkungen der Steuer- und Sozialreformen der Jahre 1999-
2005 auf die automatischen Stabilisatoren Deutschlands, October 2010 
77  Drini Imami, Endrit Lami and Holger Kächelein, Political cycles in income from pri-
vatization – The case of Albania, January 2011 
78  Reiner Franke and Frank Westerhoff, Structural Stochastic Volatility in Asset Pricing 
Dynamics: Estimation and Model Contest, April 2011 
79  Roberto Dieci and Frank Westerhoff, On the inherent instability of international finan-
cial markets: natural nonlinear interactions between stock and foreign exchange markets, 
April 2011 
80  Christian Aßmann, Assessing the Effect of Current Account and Currency Crises on 
Economic Growth, May 2011 
81  Björn-Christopher Witte, Fund Managers – Why the Best Might be the Worst: On the 
Evolutionary Vigor of Risk-Seeking Behavior, July 2011 
82  Björn-Christopher Witte, Removing systematic patterns in returns in a financial market 
model by artificially intelligent traders, October 2011 
83  Reiner Franke and Frank Westerhoff, Why a Simple Herding Model May Generate the 
Stylized Facts of Daily Returns: Explanation and Estimation, December 2011 
84  Frank Westerhoff, Interactions between the real economy and the stock market, Decem-
ber 2011 
85  Christoph Wunder and Guido Heineck, Working time preferences, hours mismatch and 
well-being of couples: Are there spillovers?, October 2012 
86  Manfred Antoni and Guido Heineck, Do literacy and numeracy pay off? On the rela-
tionship between basic skills and earnings, October 2012 
87  János Seregi, Zsuzsanna Lelovics and László Balogh, The social welfare function of 
forests in the light of the theory of public goods, October 2012 
88  Frank Westerhoff and Reiner Franke, Agent-based models for economic policy design: 
two illustrative examples, November 2012 
 
